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However, the work is approachable
to the motivated reader and for the
Navy’s growing cadre of Asia-Pacific
hands represents essential reading.
DALE C. RIELAGE

Serrat, Austin, Lawrence Douglas, and Martha
Merrill Umphrey, eds. Law and War. Stanford,
Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 2014. 248pp. $75

Law and War is a collection of five essays
on the role of law in war offered as part
of the Amherst Series in Law, Jurisprudence, and Social Thought. What ties the
essays together is their shared interest in
“interrogating the assumption . . . that
the insertion of law into war is necessarily a salutary achievement.” But this connection is often loose, and, while several
of the essays have a great deal of individual merit, it is perhaps a weakness
of the book that it lacks the degree of
overall coherence that one might expect.
Sarah Sewell leads off with the essay
most relevant to military legal practitioners and warfighters. In “Limits of
Law: Promoting Humanity in Armed
Conflict,” Sewell makes a compelling
argument that modern norms about
what is acceptable in war often outstrip
the limits imposed by the actual law;
that is, norms often make “unacceptable”
conduct that the law inarguably still
permits. She views this as a negative development, fearing that as gaps develop
between the norms and the law, it will
increasingly erode respect for the latter.
By way of example, Sewell highlights
the growing normative expectation that
powerful states will eliminate civilian
casualties in war, while the law of armed
conflict has always recognized an uneasy
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balance between humanitarian protection and military necessity—a balance
that “the norm of minimizing civilian
casualties” does not need to maintain.
Gabriella Blum follows Sewell, and in
“The Individualization of War” she
explains how such norms have taken
hold through a process she describes
as a shift from “collectivism” to “cosmopolitanism,” by which she means
a shift from a “state-centered set of
obligations” to one focusing on the
rights of individuals to be protected
from the evils of war. Like Sewell, Blum
asserts that this development is not
necessarily good, leading to an increasing conflation between the norms of
policing and those of warfighting (with
negative consequences to both).
The third essay represents a substantive, if not thematic, departure, as Laura
Donohue writes on “Pandemic Disease,
Biological Weapons, and War.” Donohue offers a historical treatment of U.S.
federal authority for responding to such
threats, and argues that post-9/11 fears
have led to a paradigm shift in thinking about them—from public health
menace to national security threat.
This essay is probably most relevant
to military practitioners dealing with
domestic support to civil authorities.
Samuel Moyn’s essay “From Antiwar
Politics to Antitorture Politics” offers
a fascinating comparison between the
legal arguments offered against the
Vietnam War and those often presented
regarding America’s conduct of its
post-9/11 wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Through a careful examination of the
role of law in the antiwar movement of
the 1960s and 1970s, Moyn highlights
the extent to which the debate centered
on the legality of America’s entry into
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the conflict, as opposed to focusing
on how America fought. Moyn then
traces a shift toward the end of the war,
particularly Telford Taylor’s trenchant
criticism of American warfighting
practices, which Taylor came to view
as unlawful. By contrast, Moyn argues
that criticism of our modern conflicts is
directed at the conduct of hostilities—
torture, rules of engagement, and war
crimes. He ascribes this to the end of
conscription and the relative inoculation
of much of the American public from
the effects of our wars abroad, but also
to a larger shift in the broad discourse
about the law of war in the modern era,
in which the means and methods of
warfare are much more tightly regulated.
The final essay builds to some extent on
Moyn’s work, though Larry May’s “War
Crimes Trials during and after War” is
less cogent and ultimately less valuable. May sets out to examine whether
war crimes trials are best prosecuted
while hostilities are still under way or
after hostilities are concluded. Controversially, May argues that war crimes
trials during hostilities ought to address
jus ad bellum matters: once a tribunal
finds that unlawful “aggressive war” is
being waged, soldiers of that side are
on notice that they may be participants
in the war crime of aggression. This
strikes the reviewer as highly implausible, and for that reason this essay
is perhaps the weakest of the five.
Ultimately, Law and War is a collection of essays that are largely conceptual and highly normative in their
arguments. As such it is undoubtedly
a thought-provoking and challenging
book, but also one that is not likely to
be of immediate use to military lawyers
per se. On the other hand, for nonlawyers who ponder the role of law in
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war, in policy making, and in shaping and reflecting societal norms, the
book offers many valuable insights.
JOHN MERRIAM

Daddis, Gregory. Westmoreland’s War: Reassessing American Strategy in Vietnam. Oxford, U.K.:
Oxford Univ. Press, 2015. 320pp. $36.95

General William Westmoreland, the
American commander of Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV)
from 1964 through 1968, remains one of
the most contentious personalities of the
Vietnam War, still the subject of intense
debate among veterans and historians
of the war. Prevalent still is the view
that “Westy” could not see the forest for
the trees, or vice versa, and disastrously
lacked strategic vision and operational
creativity owing to his parochial focus
on employing Cold War “big unit”
doctrine and attrition to combat an
insurgent war of unification. The most
extreme of such assessments of West
moreland comes from Lewis Sorley, who
in multiple works, notably Westmoreland: The General Who Lost Vietnam
(Houghton Mifflin, 2011), all but charges
Westmoreland with gross negligence.
Gregory Daddis, formerly of the Military
History Department at West Point and
now associate professor of history at
Chapman University, offers what he
believes is a more balanced view of this
controversial general. In Westmoreland’s War, Daddis argues that instead
of lacking understanding of the conflict in Vietnam and warmly wrapping
himself in the comfort of familiar “big
unit” doctrine, Westmoreland embraced counterinsurgency approaches
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